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ACCESS TO JUSTICE
AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL
SOLUTIONS TO A WORLDWIDE PROBLEM
Introduction
Access to Justice: Theory and Practice from a
Comparative Perspective
COLIN CRAWFORD AND DANIEL BONILLA MALDONADO*
As economic growth has increased worldwide, so has inequality-
economic, social, legal, and political.' In Latin America, socioeconomic
inequality is especially severe.2 Brazil, Colombia, and Guatemala, for
example, are some of the most socioeconomically unequal countries in
the world.3 In the United States, this inequality has been growing
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville
and Full Professor, Universidad de los Andes School of Law, BogotA.
1. See generally, e.g., GLENN-MARIE LANGE, QUENTIN WODON & KEVIN CAREY, THE
CHANGING WEALTH OF NATIONS 2018: BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2018)
(explaining that although global wealth has grown between 1994-2014, per capita wealth
has not increased).
2. See, e.g., Jeronimo Giorgi, Latin America: The Most Unequal Region in the World,
FOCUS ECON. (June 6, 2017), https://www.focus-economics.comlbloglinequality-in-latin-
america; see generally Latin America and Caribbean Register Middle Class Growth. Child
Poverty and Inequality Problems Persist, INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://www.iadb.org/en/news/news-releases/2016-10-24/latin-american-middle-class-has-
nearly-doubled,11611.html (noting persistence of inequality and child poverty in Latin
America and Caribbean region despite increases in middle class wealth).
3. See, e.g., FACUNDO ALVAREDO ET AL., WORLD INEQUALITY REPORT: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 5-7 (2018).
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rapidly over the course of the past two decades, even though it has
diminished elsewhere, such as in the European Union.4
Socioeconomic inequality, however, is not only a problem in itself. It
is also troublesome because it fosters poverty; reducing inequality is a
key step towards reducing poverty.5 Conversely, income inequality and
consequent poverty hinders robust economic growth.6 Similarly,
inequality results in the inefficient distribution of resources like
education and bank loans, undermines the solidarity and political
stability needed for articulating and implementing the redistributive
policies needed to reduce poverty, and obstructs the realization of the
poor's fundamental rights.7 Institutional change, including changes in
legal institutions, constitutes part of the necessary response to poverty,
inequality reduction, and economic redistribution.8
The effects that inequality and poverty have over fundamental
rights of the poor are particularly negative to their right to access
justice. The socioeconomic obstacles faced by the poor prevent them
from hiring lawyers to protect their interests and from simply
understanding or using the legal order. Poverty and inequality also
negatively affect the autonomy of the poor, they do not allow the poor to
interact directly with the State in order to solve their conflicts. Instead,
the poor can interact with the State only through lawyers. Thus, the
persistence and growth of inequality and poverty should cause concern
about the poor's access to justice: a right which is a central component of
democratic, liberal states.
The papers gathered in this volume analyze access to justice in
Latin America, Europe, and North America from a philosophical, legal,
and sociological perspective. In these three regions of the world, as in
the rest of the globe, liberal democracies face a troubling gap between
the normative and the descriptive: the access to justice promises made
by the legal and political system are not fully realized in practice. The
studies collected here, therefore, share two baseline assumptions. First,
the right of access to justice is fundamental in a liberal state. Access to
justice ensures that citizens are able to defend their interests in court
and achieve full inclusion in the political community. Access to justice,
4. Id. at 12-14.





7. See, e.g., LANGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 87.
8. Understanding Effective Access to Justice 11-12 (Nov. 3, 2016),
www.oecd.org/gov/Understanding-effective-access-access-justice-workshop-paper-final.pdf
(examining, inter alia, the relationship between improved rule of law and justice access to
poverty and economic inequality reduction).
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as argued by social contract theory, is at the core of liberal democracies'
normative projects. In the liberal democracies studied in this special
issue-as in all others influenced by the post-Enlightenment modern
project-contractualism and its commitment to access to justice is part
of the of theoretical toolbox used to constitute and legitimize the
political community. For all of these liberal democracies, access to
justice is necessary for achieving peace and prosperity, and for the full
inclusion of all citizens in the polity.
Second, the papers gathered in this volume agree that
epistemological, socioeconomic, and legal market disparities obstruct
the materialization of the right that citizens have to access courts and
the administration to solve their conflicts. The key objectives pursued by
liberal democracies cannot be fully realized because of poverty and
inequality. Both variables have a causal relationship with the access to
justice deficits faced by the countries studied in this special issue.
LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES, ACCESS TO JUSTICE,
AND SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
In liberal democracies, lawyers have social obligations directly
connected to the right of access to justice. Access to justice provides
citizens with the ability to turn to the judicial and administrative bodies
of the State to enforce their rights.9 As the gatekeepers of these
institutions, lawyers play a fundamental role in determining who has-
and who does not have-justice access. The right of access to justice is
multifaceted; it may include the ability to introduce and challenge
evidence presented at trial, ' 0 to have a translator when necessary to
understand trial proceedings, or to have a lawyer represent one's
interests before state judicial and administrative bodies.1 1
9. According to Mauro Cappelletti and Bryant Garth: "[Tihe right to effective access
[to justice] is increasingly recognized as a right of primordial importance . . . as the
possession of rights makes no sense if there are no mechanisms for their actual
enforcement. Access to justice can then be considered to be the most basic requirement-
the most fundamental human right- in an egalitarian legal system that seeks to guarantee
and not only proclaim the rights of all." See MAURO CAPPELLETI & BRYANT GARTH, EL
AcCESO A LA JUSTICIA- LA TENDENCIA EN EL MOVIMIENTO MUNDIAL PARA HACER
EFECTTVOS los Derechos 12-13 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], septiembre 8, 1998,
Sentencia T-476/98, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.); Corte
Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 17, 2005, Sentencia C-1177/05,
Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.).
11. These dimensions appear in various international treaties that recognize the right
to access justice. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Sept. 8,
1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20 (1967); European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6,
3
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 27:1
The right of access to justice seeks to enable citizens to exercise
their autonomy to choose, modify, and realize their life projects.12
Liberal democracies rely on these rights to protect citizens' abilities to
realize their individual autonomy.13 The right of access to justice allows
individuals to turn to an impartial third party to resolve conflicts,14 and
if individuals cannot access the administrative and judicial bodies
created by the State for this purpose, the rights in dispute cannot be
protected. If the design, procedure, and outcomes of these institutions
are inefficient, then rights are reduced to rules and principles on paper,
rather than in action. Access to justice, therefore, has consequences not
only for the public sphere, but also for the private sphere in a liberal
society. This right protects the capacity that all people have to create
and materialize their individual and collective identities. Unresolved
conflicts impede this process, and prevent people from realizing their
potential as moral agents.
Access to justice also has the objective of guaranteeing that no
member of the political community is excluded from or marginalized in
the public sphere and that everyone is able to participate effectively in
the political realm.'5 The contractualist tradition, a key part of the
theoretical article upon which modern liberal democracies rest, makes
this argument explicit.' 6 In the state of nature, there is no certainty on
how problems affecting the life, integrity, or property of individuals
should be resolved. Problems are usually resolved through violence.'7
The creation of an impartial third party who can resolve conflicts
peacefully is one of the main objectives of the move from the state of
nature to the civil state.'8 The State, in the form of judicial and
administrative bodies, has the power to resolve conflicts in a legitimate
and definitive manner. The adjudication of rights by judges or
Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 2,
7, 8, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
12. On the strong links between liberalism and access to justice see Daniel Bonilla
Maldonado, The Right to Access to Justice: Its Conceptual Architecture, 27.1 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 15 (2020). On the connections between autonomy and liberalism see
Jeremy Waldron, The Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, in EITcHE UND POLITISCHE
FREIHEIT 226 (Julian Nida-Rimelin & Wilhelm Vossenkuhl eds., 1998).
13. Bonilla, supra note 12.
14. Jorge A. Marabotto Lugar, Un Derecho Humano Esencial: El Acceso a la Justicia,
ANUARIO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 291, 291 (2003).
15. Victor Abramovich, Acceso a la Justicia y Nuevas Formas de Participaciun en la
Esfera Politica, REVISTA ESTUDIOS SOCIO-JURiDICOS 9, 10 (2007) (Colom.).
16. John Charvet, Contractarianism and International Political Theory, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT FROM HOBES TO RAWLS 175 (David Boucher & Paul Kelly eds., 1994).
17. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATAN 127-32 (Editorial Losada 2003); JOHN LOCKE, Dos
ENSAYOs SOBRE EL GOBIERNO CIVIL 205-13 (Espasa Calpe 1991).
18. LOCKE, supra note 17, at 294.
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administrative bodies allows individuals to protect themselves from the
undue interventions of third persons in their private and public life.
If individuals cannot access an impartial third party to protect their
rights, they will be, in practice, second-class citizens. For example, if
individuals cannot exercise their political rights, they will not be able to
participate effectively in the public life of the collective. If they cannot
express their ideas, vote, or circulate freely, they cannot be full
members of the political community. If they cannot access the basic
material conditions that are necessary to exercise their autonomy, they
will not be able to participate in the public sphere, and their ability to
improve their lives in the private sphere may be compromised.
Violations of these rights can only be legitimately curbed through the
intervention of the judicial branch or administrative agencies. The right
of access to justice, therefore, allows the individual to put the state
apparatus in motion to stop these violations by means of an official
statement declaring their existence, demanding that they be stopped,
and punishing the offender or compensating the victim. In the event
that the transgressor does not act in accordance with the legal mandate,
the right of access to justice demands that the coercive apparatus of the
State be put in motion. State power may intervene legitimately so that
the decision of the judicial or administrative body becomes reality.
The right to have a lawyer is one of the key dimensions of the right
of access to justice.'9 Legal representation serves an important role for
both citizens and liberal democracies. The highly technical character of
modern legal systems often, however, creates a sizeable distance
between the law and the individual.20 The majority of people do not
have the knowledge or skills to manipulate legal tools or the specialized
knowledge necessary to interact with the state judicial apparatus.21 Nor
do the majority of people have any familiarity with the substantive law
or the procedures that would allow them to reach common, valuable
results in a democratic and liberal State. For example, most people
untrained in the law could not draft a contract, file a claim, or request
that the relevant administrative bodies review a decision that adversely
affects them.
19. Deborah L. Rhode, Essay: The Pro Bono Responsibilities of Lawyers and Law
Students, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2000).
20. Shunko Rojas, Acceso a la Justicia y Pobreza, en 80 LEccIONES Y ENSAYOS 519,
522-23 (Universidad de Buenos Aires 2004).
21. Deborah Rhode argues that access to legal services is a fundamental need, because
access to justice is the means by which all other rights are protected. In addition, the
author argues that lawyers have a responsibility to help people with scarce resources,
since the system is designed by and for lawyers, which means that if a person without
legal training tries to fight again this reality, he or she will be at a disadvantage. See
Rhode, supra note 19, at 1203.
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Lawyers' social obligations emerge from the epistemological,
socioeconomic, and legal market inequalities that exist in modern
liberal democracies. Epistemological inequalities refer to the fact that
only some individuals have access to the knowledge necessary to put
legal discourse to work.22 Lawyers have access to a formal education
that trains them in the knowledge, practices, rites, and structures that
constitute the law. Not all citizens can access this knowledge-some
because their life plans direct them towards other disciplines, others
because they don't have the means to cover the costs of a university
education or did not have access to the basic education that would have
allowed them to enter a university. Regardless of the reason for the
epistemological distance that exists between law and the majority of the
people in a political community, this distance creates obstacles for
protecting the rights and guaranteeing the full inclusion of those
without legal training in the public sphere of their community.
Epistemological inequalities intersect socioeconomic inequalities.23
The right to have a lawyer has particular relevance in liberal
democracies, given the material inequalities that exist between their
citizens.24 Socioeconomic inequalities determine who has indirect access
to legal knowledge through a lawyer.25 Middle- and upper-class citizens
have the financial resources necessary to hire a lawyer while members
of lower socioeconomic classes often cannot.26 Inability to hire a lawyer
can mean exclusion from important legal processes: modern liberal
democracies have decided that, as a general rule, only those who have
22. Daniel Bonilla Maldonado et al., El trabajo juridico pro bono en Argentina 2000-
2014, in LOS MANDARINES DEL DERECHO: TRASPLANTES JURIDICOS, ANALISIS CULTURAL DEL
DERECHO Y TRABAJO PRO BONO 135, 166-67, 170-75, 189 (2017). In the words of one of the
partners interviewed for the Argentina Report, "This obligation [to do pro bono work] is
justified based on the fact that lawyers have the key of access to justice, because in our
system, if you don't have a lawyer, you can't access the courts." Interview No. 31, Pro Bono
Coordinator, (July 3, 2014). Another of the interviewees similarly indicated: "those of us
who are lawyers have a tool that can help; [law] is the key to special knowledge."
Interview No. 34, Junior Lawyer (July 3, 2014). Another lawyer states, "We have a license
to access justice and that creates an obligation. This is an essential service of a civilized
society and must be instrumental to opening the door; this should therefore be an ethical
obligation." Interview No. 39, Associate (July 4, 2014).
23. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013,
1014-15 (2004); see generally, GERMAN SILvA GARCIA, EL MUNDO REAL DE LOS ABOGADOS Y
DE LA JUSTICIA, VOL. I AL IV (2001).
24. Rojas, supra note 20, at 524-25.
25. See Joseph R. Thome, New Models for Legal Services in Latin America, 6 HUM. RTS.
Q. 521, 527 (1984). But see Maria Inds Bergoglio, Cambios en la Profesi6n Juridica en
Andrica Latina, 5 ACADEMIA REVISTA SOBRE ENSE1RANZA DEL DERECHO 9, 12 (2007).
26. See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice- Connecting Principles to Practice, 17
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 387 (2004) ("Money may not be the root of all evil in our justice
system, but lack of money is surely responsible for much of it.").
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obtained the title of lawyer can interact with judges and administrators
with powers to adjudicate rights, and lawyers are the only ones who can
act in the majority of judicial or administrative proceedings.27
Finally, inequalities in the legal market mean that, as a general
rule, only lawyers can make use of legal discourse before the courts and
administrative bodies that adjudicate rights.28 The State, or the entities
to which it delegates, determines the criteria that allow an individual to
obtain the title of lawyer, practice his or her profession, and demand
payment for services provided.29 The monopoly that lawyers have in the
legal services market means that citizens cannot put the legal system to
work even if they have the knowledge to do so.30 Although some liberal
democracies allow citizens to represent themselves at trials or
administrative proceedings, in practice this happens very rarely.31
Moreover, the technical character of legal discourse, as mentioned
above, means that few citizens decide to do so. 32 Thus, the probability
that their interests will be adequately defended is low.
These three kinds of inequalities intersect with moral and political
principles to justify the idea that lawyers have social obligations. Thus,
for some people, the principle of solidarity requires lawyers to
contribute to the realization of the right of access to justice;33 for this
group, distributive justice principles demand it. For others, this
obligation is justified by moral principles of a religious order, such as
the command to be charitable; divine justice mandates it.34 For yet
others, this obligation is a consequence of the principle of compensatory
justice: lawyers must compensate society in return for the benefits they
receive for their monopolistic control of legal knowledge and practices. 35
27. See Rojas, supra note 20, at 523-24.
28. See Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and
Research, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 543 (2013).
29. Fiona McLeay, The Legal Profession's Beautiful Myth: Surveying the Justifications
for the Lawyer's Obligation to Perform Pro Bono Work, 15 INT. J. LEGAL PROF. 249, 259-60
(2008).
30. See Rhode, supra note 23, at 1015.
31. See id. at 1016.
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Daniel E. Bonilla Maldonado, El Trabajo Pro Bono en Colombia 2009-
2012, in Los MANDARINES DEL DERECHO 207, 216-22 (2017).
34. See, e.g., Daniel E. Bonilla Maldonado, El Trabajo Pro Bono en Chile 2000-2014, in
LOS MANDARINES DEL DERECHO 285, 298-04 (2017).
35. See Elissa Madeline Stoffels Ughetta, La Responsabilidad Social y el Trabajo Pro
Bono: El Abogado Como un Agente de Cambio en Negocios Ganar-Ganar en el Siglo XXI,
DERECHO EN SOCIEDAD, July 2013, at 1, 9.
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ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE INSTITUTIONS THAT PROTECT IT
Modern liberal democracies have developed four institutions to
fulfill the State and lawyers' joint obligations to all members of the
political community to access a lawyer: public defenders' offices, court-
appointed counsel, legal clinics, and pro bono work. These institutions
aim to eliminate the access to justice deficit that exists, to varying
degrees, in all modern liberal democracies. The first institution, the
public defenders' office is created, administered, and financed directly
by the State.36 Through this entity, the State offers free legal services to
people from low socioeconomic strata.
Court-appointed counsel and legal clinics are institutions that are
developed and put into practice from the interaction between the State
and lawyers and between the public and the private spheres. Through
court-appointed counsel programs, courts and administrative bodies
appoint members of the legal community as representatives of people
with few socioeconomic resources in judicial or administrative
proceedings.3 7 In principle, lawyers have the obligation to accept the
assignment and protect the rights of their appointed clients as
competently and ethically as they do with clients who pay for their
services.38
University-operated legal clinics allow law students, under the
supervision of their professors, to represent or advise citizens from low
socioeconomic strata.3 9 In some liberal democracies-for example,
36. jQud es Defensoria Pdblica?, DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO,
http://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/public/atencionciudadanoa/1475/DefensorC3%ADa-
P%C3%BAblica.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2019).
37. Defensoria del Pueblo. Investigacidn Defensa de oficio. Oficina en Colombia del Alto
Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos. Defensoria del Pueblo.
XX Informe del Defensor del Pueblo al Congreso de la Repdblica. 20 de julio de 2013.
38. Sometimes, court-appointed counsel receive some kind of compensation from the
State as recognition of their labor. These kinds of free legal services are generally provided
in various areas of law, including family law, criminal law, civil law and labor law. See
generally LA JusTIcIA GRATUITA GufA DEL ABOGADO DE OFICIO (Lex Nova 2010) (guiding
legal counsel in the difficult task of combining good professional work with the
administrative and bureaucratic management hat is required in the processing of free
justice).
39. Erika Castro-Buitrago et al., Clinical Legal Education in Latin America, in THE
GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT: EDUCATING LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 60, 70 (Frank S.
Bloch ed., 2011); Frank S. Bloch, Access to Justice and the Global Clinical Movement, 28
WASH. UNIV. J.L. & POL'Y 111, 126-27 (2008); Felipe GonzAlez, La Ensehianza Clinica en
Derechos Humanos e Interds Ptiblico en Sudamerica, INSTITUTO DE INVESTIGACIONES
JURIDICAS 315, 315 (2004), http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/libros/5/2466/19.pdf.
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Colombia and Chile-legal clinics are mandatory.40 Universities must
create these kinds of academic units and students must perform this
social service. In these cases, States regulate and supervise the
activities of legal clinics. In some other liberal democracies-for
example, Argentina and the United States-legal clinics are optional.4 1
Universities create them, and students participate in them on a
voluntary basis.
The last institution, pro bono legal work, emerges from within the
legal profession.42 Lawyers are the ones who structure pro bono service
and put it into practice; as a general rule, the State does not intervene
in how it is developed.43 Lawyers organize themselves voluntarily to
create entities and processes that allow the provision of free legal
serviceS44 to people with fewer financial resources.45 Unlike the free
legal services that lawyers have historically provided, pro bono work is
not provided in a sporadic, individual, or informal manner. Pro bono
services are free legal services that have been institutionalized in the
legal communities of modern liberal democracies.46
Pro bono legal discourse and practices have spread widely in the last
twenty years. The United States has been a pioneer in its creation and
development.47 However, a few initiatives have been developed in
Europe and Latin America, which aim to create and institutionalize a
pro bono culture within their respective territories.48 The European Pro
Bono Alliance has been a pioneer in the promotion of pro bono work in
40. In Colombia, law students have the obligation to do pro bono work in law schools'
legal clinics. See L. 583, junio 12, 2000, Diario Oficial [D.O.]; Castro-Buitrago et al., supra
note 39, at 78.
41. Jorge Witker, La Enseiianza Clinica Como Recurso de Aprendizaje Juridico, 5
ACADEMIA: REVISTA SOBRE ENSERANZA DEL DERECHO 181, 187-88 (2007).
42. Rhode, supra note 19, at 1203-05.
43. Only rarely does the State require lawyers to do this kind of work. The state of
New York in the United States obligates its lawyers to do 50 pro bono hours per year. See
The Legal Profession - Pro Bono, NYCOURTS.GOv, http://ww2.nycourts.govlattorneys
/probonolbaradmissionreqs.shtmi (last visited Nov. 8, 2019).
44. Lucie E. White, Pro Bono or Partnership? Rethinking Lawyers' Public Service
Obligations for a New Millennium, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 134, 140 (2000).
45. Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).
46. Scott L. Cummings, Access to Justice in the New Millennium - Achieving the
Promise of Pro Bono, 32 HUM. RTS. 6, 6 (2005).
47. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 145-84 (2004) (discussing pro bono
practices in the United States); Marlene Coir, Pro Bono and Access to Justice in America:
A Few Historical Markers, 90 MICH. B. J. 54, 54 (2011).
48. THE COMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS, THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NY, Report on the Buenos Aires Conference on Pro Bono and Access to Justice,
in 57 THE RECORD 479, 479 (2002). For an analysis of the institutionalization of pro bono
in the United States see Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono:
Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2364-65 (2010).
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its region.49 In Latin America, the experiences of Brazil,so Argentina,5 1
Chile,52 and Colombia5 3 are the oldest and most noteworthy.
Nevertheless, in other countries such as Peru,54 Mexico, 55 and the
Dominican Republic,5 6 initiatives have formed that seek to promote pro
bono work. In each country, pro bono services developed through elite
law firms, which created organizations to promote the
institutionalization of free legal services within their communities.
AimS AND STRUCTURE OF THIS ISSUE
This special issue of the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies
has two principal aims: to provide a contextual framework that supports
the issue's aim and to explore the concrete ramifications of uneven and
unequal access to justice. First, it intends to explore critically the
theoretical foundations of the right to access to justice. This right has
been widely examined from a constitutional and an empirical
perspective. The specialized literature has studied, for example, the
meaning that national or regional courts have given to the right; the
connections between access to justice and other fundamental rights, like
freedom of expression or freedom of association; and has offered solid
normative interpretations of the right to access to justice. The
specialized literature has also examined empirically the obstacles that
impede the realization of this right. It has gathered and examined data
that explains why there is a gap between the right and its
materialization in many contemporary liberal democracies.
However, paradoxically, given the relevance that access to justice
has for all liberal democracies, there are relatively few publications that
explore the theoretical foundations of this right. If we want to explore
the meaning, political relevance, and efficacy of the right to access to
justice-compelling issues throughout the world-we must then
49. See EUROPEAN PRO BONO ALILANCE, http://www.europeanprobonoalliance.org/ (last
visited Nov. 9, 2019).
50. See INSTITUTO PRO BONO, http://www.probono.org.br/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
51. See Comisi6n de Trabajo Pro Bono e Inter6s Pfiblico, PRO BONO,
http://www.probono.org.ar/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
52. See FUNDACION PRO BONO, http://www.probono.cl/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
53. See FUNDAcI6N PRO BONO COLOMBIA, http://probono.org.co/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
54. See FuNDAcI6N PRO BONO PERI, http://www.probono.org.pe/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
55. See APPLESEED MEXIcO, http://www.appleseedmexico.org/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
56. See FUNDACION PROBONO RD, http://www.probonord.org/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2019).
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examine the theoretical elements that constitute it. In order to describe
the central role of access to justice in contemporary polities and find
possible solutions for its lack of realization, we have to understand the
role this right plays in the modern liberal imagination.
To do so, we must examine the place that this right occupies in one
of the paradigmatic ways of founding modern liberal democracies,
namely, social contract theory. The three articles that constitute the
first part of this special issue, therefore, examine critically the strong
links and tensions between the right of access to justice and Hobbes's
and Locke's versions of contractualism.
In the first article, Daniel Bonilla offers a cultural analysis of the
right of access to justice. Bonilla presents a descriptive and analytical
reading of the normative role access to justice plays in Hobbes's and
Locke's theories. Amnon Lev, in the second article, moves away from the
normative narrative offered by social contract theory and makes explicit
how Hobbes's and Locke's versions of contractualism create the
conditions that would make the realization of the right very difficult, if
not impossible, for most members of a liberal political community. In
the last article of this section, Colin Crawford connects social contract
theory with one of the most relevant issues confronting liberal
democracies today: access to justice and collective and diffuse rights.
Crawford explores the tensions between social contract theory's
individualism and the collective character of rights like those of a
healthy environment and the rights of consumers. Crawford also offers
a reinterpretation of Hobbes's and Locke's theories that would begin to
identify the aspects of contractual theories that are compatible with
rights that were not part of the authors' legal and political imagination.
This first part of the special issue provides a theoretical framework
that supports the issue's second aim, which is to explore the concrete
ramifications of uneven and unequal access to justice. Because access to
justice is a globally relevant issue, the national and regional studies
gathered in section two explore concrete, current examples of the reality
of persistent, unequal justice access in epistemological, socioeconomic,
and legal market terms. As such, the articles in the second part make
explicit both the relevance that access to justice actually has for liberal
democracies and the epistemological, socioeconomic, and market
inequalities that hamper its realization. The papers that constitute this
section of the special issue aim to show the ways in which the right is
politically and legally relevant for Latin America, the United States,
and Europe, as social contract theory argues that it should be. The
historical and comparative analyses that these articles offer contribute
to understanding the conceptual structure of liberal democracies. These
papers also show how the unequal distribution of legal knowledge,
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socioeconomically unjust hierarchies, and the monopoly that lawyers
have over the legal services market make it very hard for large
segments of the populations of liberal democracies to solve their
conflicts through courts or administrative bodies. The articles of the
second part, explore the specific character and impacts that these
inequalities have in different countries. The papers explore these broad
issues by examining three of the strategies articulated by liberal
democracies to contribute to the realization of the right to access to
justice: legal pro bono, legal clinics, and public defender offices.
The first two papers of this section create a bridge between the
theoretical pieces and the more empirically oriented papers that follow
them. In the first piece of this section, Scott Cummings examines the
emergence and development of movement lawyering in the United
States as a reaction to liberal legalism and its legal aid, and
individualistic strategies to confront access to justice problems. In the
second piece, Daniel Bonilla offers a cultural study of the transnational
pro bono discourse and connects these reflections to his analysis of pro
bono practices in Argentina, Colombia, and Chile. Both Cummings's and
Bonilla's articles examine the vertical relationship between lawyers and
clients and explore the way in which epistemological, socioeconomic, and
market inequalities negatively affect United States and Latin American
lawyers' efforts to contribute to the realization of the right to access to
justice through liberal legalism and pro bono.
The third paper of this section, by Ana Bejarano, examines, through
detailed and original empirical data analysis, the challenges that
Colombia's legal community faces to create a true pro bono culture in
the country and to make pro bono an effective tool to satisfy the legal
needs of the country's vulnerable. The fourth and fifth papers, by
Fernando Mufioz and Marzia Barbera, and Venera Protopapa,
respectively, examine the history, foundations, and challenges legal
clinics face in Chile and Italy. Mufioz offers a history of Chilean legal
clinics that emphasizes their character as legal transplants. He
examines in detail the paths through which legal clinics were imported
by Chile from the United States, and the differences between access to
justice clinics for individuals and legal clinics that seek to effect
permanent, structural change. Mufioz analyzes how clinics were
designed by both importers and exporters to confront the globally
relevant issues of poverty and inequality. He also analyzes the obstacles
that clinics in Chile have found to achieve their aims-obstacles that
are very similar to those historically faced by other Global South liberal
democracies, including lack of resources, legal formalism, and
academically weak law schools.
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Barbera and Protopapa connect Italian legal clinics with a rich
history of social actors' efforts to contribute to the realization of the
right to access to justice. They argue that the work of Italian legal
clinics, as in most contemporary liberal democracies, is an example of
the principle of subsidiarity. In their view, legal clinics, like Italian
workers' unions and civil society organizations, have historically acted
to confront the limitations of state actions directed to satisfy the legal
needs of vulnerable populations. Barbera and Protopapa also explore
the potential that legal clinics have to contribute to the realization of
the right to access to justice, and the obstacles that the Italian political
and economic context create for achieving this aim. Finally, Barbera
and Protopapa examine the weaknesses of litigation to achieve social
reform. As they note, individual and high-impact litigation strategies
are used globally to satisfy the legal needs of vulnerable populations or
to protect and promote the public interest. Both strategies, they argue,
have important restrictions for long-term social transformation.
In the last two papers of the special issue, Alexandre Cunha and
Manuel Iturralde examine the strengths and weaknesses of Brazil's and
Colombia's public defender offices. Cunha describes the origins and
strengths of the Brazilian public defender system. He argues that this
system can be positively characterized as a national network of highly
trained and independent public officials that is funded fully by the
State. Conversely, and less positively, he also argues that there is a
notable gap between this system's aims and the needs of the poor it, in
theory, exists to serve. As he explains, the demand for free legal services
by vulnerable Brazilian populations is greater than the volume of
services that even a strong public defender system can actually provide.
Cunha, therefore, focuses on the particular ways in which class
inequalities found in all liberal democracies are manifest in the
Brazilian context.
In the final paper of this section and the special issue, Iturralde
examines the structural problems that cut across Colombia's criminal
system and their effects on access to justice for vulnerable populations.
Through the analysis of a life story, the examination of empirical data,
and the use of sociological theory, Iturralde describes and analyzes the
tensions between the l gal needs of Colombia's vulnerable populations
and the efforts of public defender offices to satisfy them. Iturralde
argues that these tensions are an example of a punitive conservative
turn, in Colombia and globally, that cuts across most contemporary
liberal democracies. This in turn, Iturralde argues, constitutes an effort
to exercise the coercive power of the state to confront global issues of
poverty and inequality.
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It is important to emphasize, however, that the studies in this issue
also recognize that the global problems and the variables that explain
them are locally concretized in distinct ways. Access to justice is a global
challenge; the reasons that explain its existence and the strategies to
confront them are also global. Yet, the ways in which they emerge,
mutate, and operate are local. As the papers gathered in this volume
make explicit, access to justice has challenges, social impacts, and
solutions take different shapes locally. Poverty and inequality take
dissimilar forms, as do pro bono initiatives, legal clinics, and public
defenders' offices. These forms are context dependent. Brazil and
Colombia, to cite two examples from the papers collected here, have
levels of poverty and inequality that are notably different from those of
the United States and Italy. Similarly, the structure and impact of pro
bono in Chile, Colombia, and Argentina vary in important ways. The
history and institutional design of Chilean legal clinics are very
different from the history and institutional design of Italian legal
clinics. The strengths of the Brazilian public defenders' office outweigh
those of the Colombian public defenders' office: the economic, human,
and infrastructural resources available for the former are much higher
than those available to the latter. Both explicitly and implicitly, the
studies assembled here address these differences.
In sum, this special issue attempts to offer a rigorous and
transnational assessment of the right to access justice. The essays
explore the right to access to justice's theoretical dimensions through an
analysis of the centrality that this right has in social contract theory
and presents national and regional studies that offer a detailed analysis
of the obstacles that most, if not all, contemporary liberal democracies
confront for the realization of the right to access to justice.
